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 Abstract 
 
This paper studies the effects of deregulation following the UK Building 
Societies Act 1986, which opened the way for competition between building 
societies and commercial banks and introduced a procedure for the 
demutualisation of a building society.  It is argued that the Act brought about a 
rearrangement of property rights which destabilised the building society form. 
A wave of demutualisations followed in the 1990s. The beneficiaries of change 
included corporate managers whose earnings and status were enhanced 
following conversion, and speculative investors who profited from windfall 
gains.  These were set against losses to borrowers, in the form of higher costs of 
loans, and to communities, in the form of reduced diversity of services.  There 
is no guarantee that the recent trajectory of the sector is one of ‘evolution to 
efficiency’.  Rather, its experience illustrates the often unexpected 
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This paper studies the effects of deregulation of the UK building 
society sector following the Building Societies Act 1986.  The 
traditional, pre-1986 building society form contained within it several 
institutional features which were designed to minimise what 
Hansmann (1996) refers to as internal ‘governance costs’.  These 
included strict limitation of corporate objects (the ‘straightjacket’), the 
practice of one-member, one vote, and the persistence of complex 
rules for winding up a society or transferring its business.  The effect 
was to minimise internal divergencies of interest and to lock away the 
surplus or residual from the organisation’s activities in such a way as 
to preclude predatory strategies for gaining access to it by a particular 
generation of members.  In the process, most building societies acted 
in a manner akin to what Hansmann (1996) refers to as ‘non-profits’, 
that is, entities without owners.  
 
The Building Societies Act 1986 opened the way for competition 
between building societies and commercial banks and at the same 
time introduced a procedure for  ‘demutualisation’, that is to say, the 
conversion of a building society into an investor-owned commercial 
company.  By allowing conversion, the Act made it possible for the 
residual to be unlocked and distributed to the current generation of 
members.  This undermined the basis for the principle of ‘identity of 
interest’ between lenders and borrowers on which corporate 
governance in building societies had previously rested.  As a result, 
by the mid-1990s a wave of demutualisations had begun, spurred on 
by a combination of managerial initiative and campaigns led by 
‘carpetbaggers’ intent on gaining a windfall profit for their initial 
investment once conversion went ahead.  In a minority of societies, 
management responded by building new defences against predation, 
in the form of charitable assignments and other poison-pill like 
  1devices aimed at locking away the residual once more.  However, the 
future of the mutual form in this sector is currently in some doubt. 
 
Two interpretations of the evolution of the building society sector 
after deregulation are possible.  According to one, the move towards 
demutualisation reflected the replacement of an archaic and decaying 
business form (the financial mutual) by a more modern and efficient 
one (the shareholder-owned company).  The 1986 Act was the 
catalyst for change which had been unduly delayed by the over-rigid 
regulatory framework which it replaced.  This account stresses 
evolution to efficiency at the level of the institutional framework.  A 
second interpretation is that demutualisation signifies the loss of an 
inherently efficient form for the delivery of long-term, low risk 
savings contracts and loan contracts.  The change in the regulatory 
framework which occurred in the mid-1980s was not neutral; it 
removed the basis on which conflicts of interest between investor and 
borrower members had previously been managed, creating an 
institutional hybrid which was inherently unstable.  The main 
beneficiaries of change were corporate managers who used 
conversion to boost their earnings and status and ‘carpetbaggers’ who 
profited from windfall gains.  These groups were a better position to 
organise for conversion than the main losers from demutualisation, 
the borrowers, were to resist it.  Accordingly, a path-dependent 
explanation which stresses the role played by institutional lock-in in 
producing sub-optimal outcomes is called for. 
 
These competing claims will be examined as follows.  Section 2 
below outlines a theoretical explanation for the emergence of 
financial mutuals which draws on the ‘new institutional’ analysis of 
Hansmann (1996).  Section 3 examines in more detail the recent 
history of the UK building society sector and considers how far its 
experience bears out Hansmann’s hypotheses concerning the 
efficiency properties of the mutual and non-profit forms.  Section 4 
evaluates the process of change and considers the case for legislative 
reform aimed at stabilising the sector.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
  22. The corporate governance properties of financial mutuals and 
non-profits 
 
Henry Hansmann’s seminal analysis in The Ownership of Enterprise 
(1996) demonstrates the diversity of corporate governance 
arrangements available for the legal organisation of the enterprise.   
Different types of enterprise are characterised by different arrangements 
of property rights, income streams, and regulation.  At the heart of 
Hansmann’s analysis is a theory of ownership.  Ownership has two 
dimensions: residual control rights of the kind emphasised by the 
property rights theory of the firm (Hart, 1995) and residual income 
rights of the kind stressed by the nexus of contracts approach (Fama 
and Jensen, 1982; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991).  Hansmann argues 
that residual control rights and income rights tend to go together 
because ‘if those with control had no claim on the firm’s residual 
earnings, they would have little incentive to use their control to 
maximise those earnings, or perhaps even to pay out the earnings 
received’.  This would not be a problem in a world of complete 
contracting.  But where contracts are ex ante incomplete - which is 
almost invariably the case in complex arrangements of corporate 
governance involving inputs from multiple stakeholders (see Zingales, 
1998) - separation of control and income rights threatens to give rise to 
insurmountable contracting costs.  This problem is avoided by 
allocating residual rights to the group with the strongest incentive for 
resolving, ex post, the conflicts which will inevitably arise: ‘the essence 
of what we term “control” is precisely the authority to determine those 
aspects of firm policy that, because of high transaction costs or 
imperfect foresight, cannot be specified ex ante in a contract but rather 
must be left to the discretion of those to whom authority is granted’ 
(Hansmann, 1996: 12). 
 
The various corporate governance forms solve this problem in different 
ways: 
 
‘in an investor-owned firm, the transactions between the firm and 
the patrons [or stakeholders]
1 who supply the firm with capital 
  3occur in the context of ownership, while transactions with workers, 
other suppliers, and customers all take the form of market 
contracting.  An employee-owned firm, in contrast, obtains labour 
inputs from workers whose relationship is one of ownership, but 
obtains its capital and other supplies, and sells its products, through 
market contracting.  And a consumer cooperative, in turn, obtains 
capital, labour, and all other inputs through market contracting 
while selling the goods and services it produces in transactions 
embedded in ownership’ (Hansmann, 1996: 20) 
 
The result is the multiplicity of forms observed in practice (see Table 
1). 
 
Table 1: Economic organisations characterised by corporate 
governance structures 
 
























private companies or 
‘quasi partnerships’) 
 
According to Hansmann, particular ownership structures emerge as an 
efficient response to the need to reduce the sum total of ‘governance’ 
(or transaction) costs, which he classifies in terms of (1) contracting 
costs and (2) ownership costs. 
 
Contracting costs are essentially the costs of contracting in a 
decentralised market setting, such as monopoly, ex-post lock in, high 
risks of opportunism in very long term contracting, asymmetric 
  4information, and other forms of strategic behaviour.  Where such 
costs are excessively high, efficiency requires that stakeholder groups 
with most to lose from market transacting should seek to ‘internalise’ 
the transaction through ownership.  For example, the risks of 
fluctuations in market conditions over the life of a very long term 
contract can be minimised by combining ownership with custom; in 
the case of mutual assurance companies, what the members might 
lose as customers they would gain as owners.   
 
The costs of ownership are, conversely, the costs of integrating assets 
into a single entity.  These include the familiar kind of agency costs 
which arise from the separation of control and ownership in large, 
publicly-held companies, but also the costs of collective decision 
making which arise when preferences of stakeholders are highly 
heterogeneous.  Active participation in governance also carries with it 
high costs in terms of time and effort.  In addition, ownership creates 
costs as a result of the uneven distribution of risks: identifying a set of 
residual claimants may be highly costly if that group is not in a 
position to diversify its risk in some way.   
 
Applying Hansmann’s calculus, we arrive at the suggestion that 
efficient corporate governance forms are those which minimise the 
sum total of (1) (external) contracting costs and (2) (internal) 
governance costs.  The contracting costs criterion suggests allocating 
rights to that group of stakeholders whose inputs cannot be effectively 
contracted for externally.  The governance costs criterion assigns 
ownership to that group which can most effectively undertake the role 
of governance in the interests of the firm.  A highly significant 
implication of this analysis is that the two criteria may point in opposite 
directions, or at least may be in tension with one another. On the basis 
that more efficient forms will, over time, display greater stability and 
survival value than those which are inefficient, Hansmann makes the 
following predictions: 
 
  51. ownership is very rarely shared across different stakeholder groups, 
because of the high collective action costs which would arise from 
heterogeneous interests; 
 
2. where high external contracting costs and low internal governance 
costs point to the same group being the most efficient owners, forms 
based on this outcome will generally prevail over rivals; 
 
3. where contracting costs and governance costs point in different 
directions, it may be efficient to grant ownership to passive owners 
who at least have the assurance that no other stakeholder group can 
claim ownership; 
 
4. alternatively, the efficient solution may be to assign control to no 
single group, as in the case of the non-profit firm. 
 
Of particular interest for present purposes is Hansmann’s suggestion 
that financial mutuals, such as building societies or (in the US 
context) mutual savings and loans associations, have many of the 
features of non-profits such as private-sector health care providers, 
universities, and charities.  Customer ownership of financial 
institutions such as banks and insurance companies was established 
early in the nineteenth century, he suggests, as a way of dealing with 
the problem of managerial opportunism and asymmetric information; 
most investor-owned banks engaged in speculative (high risk, high 
return) ventures which put savings of investors at risk.  One solution 
in the US context was provided by mutual savings banks which were 
set up to attract long-term savings from depositors but also donations 
from wealthy philanthropists; the directors held the assets on trust for 
depositors with the latter having no voting rights.  This is a 
characteristic example of a non-profit, in which it is impossible to 
release residual profits in cash form for any one of the various 
stakeholder groups; at best, the residual is released to the members in 
the form of improved services, or is reinvested.   
 
  6By contrast, early building societies (or in the US, savings and loans) 
were true mutuals which were customer-owned; depositors obtained 
voting rights, on the basis of one person, one vote (although not one 
share, one vote, as in the case of shareholder-owned companies), and 
rights over the residual income.  The ‘non-permanent’ building 
society which wound itself up after all the members had purchased a 
property had the advantage of overcoming asymmetric information 
problems about credit risks, since the members were all known to 
each other or came from the same locality.  The traditional credit 
union with its ‘common bond’ (the requirement of membership of a 
particular community or employment) operated in the same way. 
 
With the later emergence of the ‘permanent’ building society or 
mutual savings and loan association, successive and overlapping 
generations of borrowers entered the picture, and societies began to 
distinguish between borrowers and depositors.  According to 
Hansmann, this eliminated some of the advantage which mutual 
forms had had over investor-owned banks; as a result, they became 
more like traditional mutual savings banks, in which members were 
generally passive, and self-perpetuating boards operated as fiduciaries 
for the depositors. 
 
From this point on, competition between mutual and investor-owned 
forms was decisively influenced, in Hansmann’s analysis, by 
government regulation.  Government regulation of investor-owned 
banks, which took the form of minimum capital requirements, 
maintenance of minimum-level liquid reserves, and limitations on 
investments that could be included in bank portfolios, removed some 
of the risks for depositors of commercial bank lending.  In the 
aftermath of the Great Depression, mandatory deposit insurance was 
imposed on all banks (whether investor-owned or mutual), thereby 
removing still further the advantage of mutuals.  For a time, 
regulation continued to favour mutuals on tax grounds and through 
regulation of interest rates on deposits.  This was done on the basis 
that mutuals were safer from the point of view of government as 
insurer of last resort, although this preference did not take the form, as 
  7it might have done, of charging a lower insurance premium to 
mutuals.  By the 1980s, preferential regulation of mutuals had been 
removed and bank deregulation meant that restrictions on investment 
portfolios no longer existed; it also became possible to transform 
mutuals into investor-owned banks.  The subsequent unhappy history 
of the savings and loans sector then unfolded: a large number of 
converted savings and loans associations became insolvent as a result 
of high-risk loan activities, engendered in large part by the moral 
hazard implicit in the government’s willingness to underwrite their 
activities through deposit insurance at the same time as liberalising 
the restrictions which had previously been imposed on lending. 
 
According to Hansmann, the conversion of US savings and loans 
from mutual to investor-owned companies in the 1980s occurred at a 
point when ‘investor owned banks were giving evidence of being less 
efficient, overall, than their mutual counterparts’ (Hansmann, 1996: 
258).  Mutuals, he suggests, were less effective at controlling costs 
than investor-owned banks, but their much lower failure rate more 
than offset this.  On the other hand, investor-owned banks had more 
ready access to equity capital and thus were able to respond more 
effectively to shifts in consumer demand and to the possibilities 
created by new technology.  His analysis thus leaves open the issue of 
how we should regard the evolutionary processes at work in the US 
case.  Was the demise of the mutual savings and loan sector the 
inadvertent result of regulatory failure, or were more fundamental 
economic forces at work in the unravelling of the mutual form?  To 
help answer this question, we will now look in more detail at the 
British experience which is in some respects similar to that of the US 
but also has several distinctive features. 
 
3.  Deregulation and demutualisation in the British building 
society sector 
 
3.1 The origins of the building society movement 
 
  8In Britain building societies grew out of the friendly society 
movement of the 18th century.  Their emergence was linked to the 
industrial revolution and the need for housing for workers moving to 
cities and experiencing very poor living conditions.  Members would 
agree to contribute regularly to the society, build houses together, and 
allocate houses by lottery until each member was housed.  As this 
model was widely adopted, building societies became responsible for 
the supply of a substantial proportion of the total housing stock in the 
UK (Morgan, 1995). 
 
The first legislation covering friendly societies was enacted in 1793 
and the first Act covering building societies was enacted in 1836, 60 
years after the emergence of the first building society (Ketley’s 
Building Society of Birmingham, founded in 1775). As we have 
noted, the first building societies had a limited lifespan, related to the 
specific objective of providing housing for a defined group of 
members.  Once this had been accomplished and the money had been 
repaid, surplus assets, if any, would be distributed equally among 
members and the society would be terminated.  There were 
nevertheless problems associated with the terminating society system, 
particularly in relation to a lack of funds to afford construction of 
enough houses.  The first Building Societies Act attempted to address 
these problems and, in so doing, encouraged the appearance of 
permanent societies (the first was founded in 1845) in which funds for 
building houses were supplemented by funds from people wanting to 
save, but not necessarily wanting a house. As Hird (1996) argues, this 
development loosened the bond which had previously existed 
between savers and borrowers.  However, the ‘permanent’ form had 
the advantage of widening the investor base and offering a stable and 
relatively risk-free form of saving, while also successfully managing 
the inherent conflict of interest between the two groups for over a 
century. 
 
Permanent societies proved to be highly effective; they were able to 
borrow money from investors to build houses more quickly, create 
different classes of shares, and set up reserve funds (Clarke, 1998).  
  9By 1900 there were 2,286 permanent and terminating societies across 
the UK.  Up to 1950, individual building societies remained 
comparatively small, collectively holding only 10% of retail savings.  
Although their share of the mortgage market was significant, the 
market itself had remained relatively small, with owner-occupation 
only accounting for around 25% of households by 1950 (Boleat, 
1987). Medium and large-sized building societies emerged due in part 
to organic growth and also to a large number of takeovers and 
acquisitions in this sector, resulting in a substantial decrease in the 
overall number of building societies, from over 2,200 in 1900, to 481 
in 1970, and 130 in 1988, prior to the demutualisation wave (Wells, 
1989; Barnes and Ward, 1999).  
 
The period of greatest growth in the building society movement was 
between 1955 and 1980. During the period there was limited 
competition from other financial institutions for lending for house 
purchase and limited competition within the building society 
movement itself as a result of rate cartels.  Building societies in effect 
had an oligopoly with banks in the retail deposits market.  In addition, 
over this period there was a decline in private sector rented 
accommodation as a result of rent controls, tax advantages for owner 
occupiers, and limits on public-sector spending on housing. Owner-
occupation increased to 50% of all dwellings in 1970, and then to 
65% in 1988, partially as a result of council house sales beginning in 
the late 1970s.  Then, following the stock market crash of 1987, 
building societies experienced a flood of funds into the sector, looking 
for secure forms of saving (Graham, 1984; Barnes and Ward, 1999). 
Altogether, over the 150 years up to the mid-1990s building societies 
are reported to have built up £16bn of reserves (Davidmann, 1996). 
 
3.2 The property rights of building society members in the 
‘traditional’ mutual (pre-1986) 
 
The growth of the building societies, while assisted by the 
competitive and regulatory factors just referred to, was also 
engendered by the success of the particular legal form given to 
  10permanent societies, and to the type of corporate governance which it 
gave rise to.  Building society legislation, up to the deregulating 
measures of the 1980s, severely confined the permissible objects of 
building societies and imposed other restraints on building society 
constitutions.  As the Building Societies Association (BSA) noted in 
1983,  
 
‘the building society is a special legal creature.  It derives its 
powers primarily from the Building Societies Act 1962.  Like 
other “creatures of statute”, for example local authorities…, 
building societies can do only those things and can operate only 
in the manner which is envisaged by legislation.  They are 
therefore unlike most normal corporate bodies which are free to 
decide their functions and method of operation within the general 
law of the land’ (BSA, 1983: 5). 
 
Similarly, a leading legal authority described the regime inherited 
from the nineteenth century in the following terms: 
 
‘it is necessary to understand that [building societies] are special 
statutory creatures, in a statutory straight-jacket, and that unlike 
individuals, partnerships or companies in this respect, they have 
no choice in the matter of the business which they carry on’ 
(Wurtzburg and Mills, 1976: 3). 
 
In this vein, Thompson (1995) refers to the property rights of building 
society members in the traditional model as ‘severely attenuated’ by 
comparison to those of shareholders in commercial companies.  The 
following features, in particular account for this attenuation. 
 
(1) Restricted  objects.  As Thompson notes, building societies began 
as specialised financial intermediaries, providing housing finance for 
persons of comparatively modest means, and, notwithstanding the 
deregulatory provisions of the 1980s, have continued to focus on the 
provision of financial services in connection with housing. The 1962 
Act, consolidating the nineteenth century legislation, stated that a 
  11building society could be established for the sole purpose of ‘raising, 
by the subscription of the members, a stock or fund for making 
advances to members out of the funds of the society upon security by 
way of mortgage of freehold or leasehold estate’.  This limitation of 
objects encapsulated the ownership structure of the traditional 
building society: the near-complete correspondence between its 
owners and its customers.  A society was not allowed to advance 
loans to persons other than its members, and it was the members’ own 
subscriptions, in turn, which were intended to be the principal source 
of funds.  As the BSA (1983: 5) put it,  
 
‘Section 1(1) and subsequent sections of the [1962] Act mean 
effectively that building societies are owned by their customers 
rather than by equity shareholders.  As such, societies are 
frequently referred to as being mutual although this term is 
difficult to define and is not used in building society legislation.  
Societies raise most of their funds through share investments but 
the point is that membership is incidental to investing.  Moreover, 
borrowers have to become members or they are not able to 
borrow’. 
 
When commercial banks started moving into the mortgage market in 
the early 1980s, building societies pushed for legislative changes that 
would allow them to move into areas of service provision previously 
only offered by banks. The 1986 Act altered the position slightly by 
stipulating that the principal (no longer sole) purpose of a building 
society was to be the raising of funds for advances to its own 
members.  This, it was said, ‘may have loosened the statutory 
straight-jacket; but it has not discarded it’.
2  The other, subsidiary 
purposes allowed to building societies were still those defined by the 
Act. These empowered building societies to extend their services into 
areas such as personal loans and current account provision, in 
competition with commercial banks (see Wells, 1989). In addition, 
the Act formally gave building societies the ability to borrow on 
wholesale markets up to 20% of their total deposits (most societies 
had previously had this right under their constitutions but the Act 
  12regularised the position).  This was extended to 40% and then 50% by 
1997.  In some areas building societies began to offer more customer-
attractive services, such as free banking and interest-paying current 
accounts, which placed pressure on banks to focus to a greater extent 
on customer service (Gentle et al., 1991: Davidmann, 1996). 
However, certain limitations on building societies’ activities 
remained.  Under the 1997 Act, at least 75% of business assets still 
had to be held in mortgages and at least 50% of funds had to come 
from members who are individuals.  In practice, societies continue to 
remain well within these boundaries.
3  
 
The Act of 1997 made a further change by allowing a building society 
to choose its own subsidiary purposes by reference to its 
memorandum of association.
4  Moreover, although the principal 
purpose must be ‘that of making loans which are secured on 
residential property and are funded substantially by its members’,
5 the 
reference to the members being the main source of the fund was 
removed.  The implication of this change was building societies could 
now engage in a wider range of commercial activities.  However, 
since the principal purpose of a society remained the making of loans 
to members, it could be said that the benefits of the society’s wider 
activities were still intended to accrue to the members (in the form of 
cheaper loans, for example, in the case of borrowers, or higher 
savings rates in the case of investors). 
 
(2)  Dispersal of internal control rights.  The traditional rule within 
building societies has been one member, one vote.  In the words of the 
BSA (1983: 5), ‘voting power in a building society is not normally 
weighted according to the value of shares held and it follows that 
except in the smallest societies it is impossible for even a substantial 
number of members to have sufficient votes to enable them to 
exercise control over the society’. This means, as Thompson puts it 
(1995: 345), that the separation of ownership and control is 
‘particularly acute’.  Members have little incentive to become active 
in internal governance issues because of the difficulty of putting 
together coalitions of voters, and the tendency of individuals to free 
  13ride on the action of others in attempting to do so.  On the other hand, 
the possibility that incumbent managers would be free from scrutiny 
for this reason is constrained in practice by a number of factors 
including the regulatory controls exercised by the Building Societies 
Commission, the need for managements to build up reserves to fund 
any expansion (in the absence of any external  equity capital) and the 
possibility of low-cost exit by investors, who are generally able to 
move their funds out of societies on very short notice. 
 
(3) Limited residual risks of members.  Investor-members of a 
building society, who can normally withdraw their funds at any time, 
are not in the same position as shareholders in a public company, 
whose investments are in a sense irreversible: they can only recover 
them if the company succeeds and they can sell their shares on the 
open market for at least the amount they paid for them.  The essence 
of the traditional property right, then, was that building society 
members were exposed to limited risk.  As the BSA put it in 1983, 
with regard to investors: 
 
‘the shareholder in a building society is in a very different 
position from the shareholder in a limited company… the 
purchase of shares in a limited company is speculative and 
involves high transaction costs.  It is possible to make a capital 
gain or to lose a part, if not all, of the investment.  By contrast the 
attractions of investment in building societies are that there is, in 
practice, no chance of a loss or gain in capital value (indeed, the 
Association operates a scheme to protect share investors), and 
that the investment is readily withdrawable.  As far as most 
people are concerned being a shareholder in a building society is 
analogous to being a depositor in a bank rather than a shareholder 
in a limited company’ (BSA, 1983: 6). 
 
(4) Limited residual claims. The traditional logic was that just as 
building society members had limited risks, so they also had limited 
claims to the residual income of the society.  Thompson (1995: 344) 
suggests that the owner members, nevertheless, ‘have the right to 
  14approve a change in ownership of the entire society and may receive 
payment in compensation for any ownership claims thereby lost’.     
This statement is true in the sense that, upon a winding up of a 
society, any surplus would indeed revert to its members, under 
general principles of law.   
 
However, prior to the 1986 Act, the only occasion on which a society 
would be wound up or dissolved was, in practice, when it failed and 
had to be merged with another, more successful society.  A voluntary 
winding up was possible under statute if three quarters of the 
members, holding between them not less than two thirds of the shares, 
signed an instrument of dissolution – a formidably high barrier. Even 
then, the procedure set out in the Act was long and complex.   
Alternatively, winding up could occur following a special resolution 
(three quarters majority) at an extraordinary general meeting, but even 
then only under the supervision of the court.  Building societies could 
make their own, separate provision for a more straightforward 
winding up, but it would not have been in the interests of most the 
managements of most societies to take up this option.  The residual 
ownership rights of members were, therefore, more or less completely 
theoretical at this stage.   
 
This incentive structure was, arguably, a highly efficient way of 
providing a low-risk, long-term borrowing arrangement for the 
principal users of building society services, namely, those with 
limited means of their own.  Borrowers were safeguarded against the 
risks of any failure by the society in the decades-long loan contract by 
a number of features of building society constitutions: the classes of 
investors and borrowers were, effectively, the same, thereby 
establishing a strong homogeneity of interests, and the possibilities 
for speculative gain were virtually non-existent thanks to the 
restrictions on building society objects and the dispersal of voting 
power, in addition to the effects of regulation. 
 
3.3 The process of demutualisation 
 
  15The crucial change made by the 1986 Act was not the modest 
extension of building society powers, but the provision for 
demutualisation.  Up to this point only agreed mergers among 
building societies had been allowed.  This change was established in 
line with the intention of giving societies greater freedom to diversify 
into a wider range of financial services if they so wished, and in line 
with a broader programme of deregulation.  At the time, it was 
generally expected that ‘[not] more than a handful of building 
societies, if any, [would] attempt this course of action’ (Boleat, 1987: 
34; see also Hird, 1996). As events turned out, the most distinctive 
feature of the building societies sector over the past 15 years has been 
the demutualisation phenomenon. 
 
The Abbey National Building Society was the first to demutualise in 
1989.  At the time it was the second-largest building society.  In 1995 
the Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society converted into a 
commercial bank and was simultaneously taken over by the Lloyds 
Bank Group.  In 1996 Abbey National took over National & 
Provincial Building Society.  In 1997 there was a spate of 
demutualisations.  Alliance & Leicester Building Society, Halifax 
Building Society (the largest building society - having merged with 
Leeds Permanent in 1995), Woolwich Building Society, Northern 
Rock Building Society and Bristol & West Building Society (acquired 
by the Bank of Ireland) all converted into commercial banks.   
 
Up to that point, conversions had all taken place with the support of 
the boards of the building societies; the main instigators of change 
had been building society managers themselves.  However, in April 
1999 members of the Bradford & Bingley, the second largest of the 
remaining building societies, voted to convert into a bank, this time, 
against the board’s advice and at the instigation of so-called 
‘carpetbaggers’, short-term investors whose sole motivation was to 
press for conversion in order to make a windfall gain from their 
membership.  Speculative investing and carpetbagging were suddenly 
seen to threaten a number of remaining building societies.  Members 
of the Nationwide (the largest remaining building society) and the 
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proposals.
6  However, demutualisation efforts continued in the cases 
of the Chelsea, Skipton and Portman Building Societies (Snowdon, 
2000). Of the conversions occurring since 1995, seven of these were 
among the largest 10 building societies and these conversions (not 
including Bradford & Bingley) effectively transferred two-thirds of 
the total assets held by building societies in 1994 out of the sector.
7 
 
The remaining building societies went on to develop a wide array of 
defences against carpetbaggers.  The most frequently used is the 
‘charitable assignment’, under which new members were required to 
sign away potential windfall gains to charity.  Legislation (the 
Building Societies Act 1997) altered the turnout and voting outcome 
levels required for boards to be forced to accept a proposal and 
allowed building societies to raise the number of members required to 
support an AGM resolution in order to have it put on the agenda.  In 
some cases, management took an aggressive line against 
demutualisation proposals, declaring demutualisation proposals 
invalid under the terms of articles of association and suspending the 
membership of suspected ‘carpetbaggers’ (Gow, 2000; Foley, 2000a).  
 
3.4  Property rights of building society members post-1986 
 
The significance of the 1986 Act for demutualisation lies in the way 
in which it altered the nature of property rights and so shifted the 
basis on which internal corporate governance was conducted. The 
effect of the 1986 Act (as interpreted in the courts) was that coalitions 
could now be put together in favour of demutualisation because of the 
possibility that even short-term owners would receive a share of the 
society’s assets upon its change of status.  Other changes undermined 
the close identity of interest between investors and borrowers, and so 
enhanced incentives for conversion. 
 
Section 97 of the 1986 Act made it possible for a building society to 
transfer its business to a commercial company, thereby avoiding 
completely the statutory restriction on its legitimate purposes, if a 
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new company set up for the purpose of inheriting the society’s 
business, two resolutions of the members were required: firstly, a 
simple majority of the borrowing members; and, secondly, a three 
quarters majority of all the shareholders (the investing members), 
with at least 20% of all those eligible to vote doing so.  These rules 
were designed to set a high threshold.   
 
In addition, section 100(8) of the Act made the following provision: 
 
‘Where, in connection with any transfer, rights are to be 
conferred on members of the society to acquire shares in priority 
to other subscribers, the right shall be restricted to those of its 
members who held shares in the society throughout the period of 
two years [prior to the transfer]’. 
 
The prevailing legal opinion at the time of the Act’s enactment was 
that this measure was intended to deter opportunistic entry: 
 
‘The purpose of these restrictions… is to minimise the risk of a 
sudden flow of investment into a particular society… because of 
a rumour that that society is about to transfer its business to a 
company and there might be substantial bonuses for members.  
Under these provisions, only a limited class of members will 
receive such bonuses.  The restriction should also help to allay 
fears that the directors of a society may in effect bribe members 
to vote for a transfer by the promise of substantial bonuses’.
8 
 
The failure of section 100(8) to deter opportunistic entry in the years 
following its passage was the consequence of a number of inter-
related factors.   
 
Firstly, the protection offered by section 100(8) turned out to be more 
apparent than real.  The subsection came before the courts in a test 
case brought by the Abbey National Building Society prior to its 
conversion to a commercial company in 1989.
9  The Society intended 
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simply those who had been members for two years, so-called ‘free 
shares’ in the new, listed company.  This would enable those allotted 
the shares to make an immediate windfall gain if they chose to sell 
them following the company’s listing.  A number of arguments were 
put before the court to the effect that this did not, nevertheless, 
contravene section 100(8).  The Society argued that the members who 
received shares would not do so ‘in priority to other subscribers’.  The 
judge, Sir Richard Scott VC, took the view that the point in question 
was ‘very obscure’.  He concluded that what was intended was ‘a 
provision which prevented the members, other than two year 
members, obtaining for themselves some form of priority by way of 
shareholding in the successor company’.   
 
However, he went on to hold that the subsection was not infringed if 
the non two-year members were given rights in priority over members 
of the general public; it was only if these members were given priority 
rights over others who, in the transfer document itself, were given 
rights to subscribe for shares in the new company, that the Act was 
infringed.  The effect of this ruling was that it became possible for 
gains to be made by members of the society who had joined within 
the two year period, notwithstanding the apparent aim of the Act. 
 
Secondly, building societies traditionally operated an open-door 
policy with regard to investor-members.  The effect, as Thompson 
(1995: 345) puts it, was that any property right of the existing 
members was non-exclusive. This was not a problem during the 
period when the members were, in any event, not in a position to 
profit from the residual income of the society, except in their capacity 
as users of the society’s services.  However, the ease with which entry 
could be accomplished mattered greatly once the 1986 Act opened up 
the surplus to distribution. 
 
It has been said that the government’s thinking in relation to this part 
of the 1986 Act was that since building societies were mutuals and, as 
such, ‘owned’ by their members, it was appropriate for legislation to 
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subject to the safeguards which we have just been examining.
10   The 
argument from ownership was more novel than it seemed.  As we 
have seen, although the owners did have certain residual ownership 
rights prior to 1986, these were exceptionally weak.  The reasons for 
this were, moreover, justifiable from the point of view of providing an 
efficient incentive structure for the management of risk over the long-
term: the members, both savers and borrowers, had minimal risks, in 
return for minimal income rights.   
 
Whereas, prior to the Act, the members had very restricted rights, if 
any, to the residual surplus built up by a society, after 1986 it became 
possible for all members to gain access to it by means of a 
demutualisation.  A demutualisation would release assets by making it 
possible for payments to be made to members not just in the form of 
cash distributions, but also through ‘free shares’ in the new listed 
company.  Although high voting thresholds were set for the change of 
status to proceed, the possibility of realising part of the surplus in this 
way in effect drove a wedge between borrowers and investors: 
investors, particularly those who had purchased their shares for the 
sole purpose of voting for demutualisation, now had a directly 
opposing interest to those of the borrowers.  The potential for 
divergence was then heightened by the court ruling in effect 
nullifying the intention of section 100(8) of the 1986 Act. 
 
3.5 Hostile takeover bids for building societies 
 
The most common form of hostile takeover for a publicly-listed 
company, a ‘tender offer’ in which the bidder offers to buy shares 
held by the target’s shareholders at (normally) a premium over the 
existing market price, is inapplicable to a building society, since the 
members’ shares are not alienable in this way.  However, the 1986 
Act opened up an indirect route for a hostile takeover by, as we have 
seen, allowing building societies to convert to commercial company 
status.  This made it possible for a bidder to approach the members 
with the aim of encouraging them to put forward a resolution for 
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board of the target resisted, the members could be encouraged to vote 
the directors out of office.  By this means – what in US terminology 
would be called a ‘proxy fight’ for control – the members would 
acquire shares in a commercial company which could then be 
purchased by the bidder.  This route was adopted in a hostile bid 
which was mounted, unsuccessfully as it turned out, for the Leek 
Building Society in 1997 and a similar type of bid was mounted for 
control of the Chelsea Building Society in April 2000.   
 
The procedure for putting together a hostile bid for a building society 
is potentially highly complex, even by comparison to the devices 
which must be deployed in the case of a bid for a listed company.  
Bids for control of companies listed on the London stock exchange 
are subject to the jurisdiction of the City Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers.  The City Code imposes a bid timetable and imposes a 
number of obligations upon both bidders and targets which are 
designed, on the whole, to protect minority shareholders in the target 
from oppression or abuse.  The overall impact of the City Code, in 
conjunction with a number of rules of company law and institutional 
shareholder practice, is very considerably to limit the degree to which 
target boards can frustrate bids either in advance or while a tender 
offer is being considered.  In particular, targets boards must offer 
disinterested advice to shareholders on the merits of the price which 
has been offered for their shares.  It has been argued that these 
specific obligations under the Code do not fit together well with the 
general duty of the board to act in the good faith in the interests of the 
company’s members: the Code directs the board to consider the short-
term interests of the shareholders, whereas the general company law 
duty allows them to take a longer-term view (Deakin and Slinger, 
1997). 
 
The Building Society Commission’s Transfer Procedures Guidance 
Note of April 1998
11 offered the following prudential guidance in 
relation to hostile bids: 
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takeover to its members.  The overriding duty of the board is to 
reach a view having regard to what is in the interests of the 
members as a whole, both present and future, borrowing 
members as well as shareholders… 
 
The decision of the board to recommend a takeover must be 
based on a proper evaluation of the issues in relation to a strategic 
assessment of how the society can best serve its members’ 
 
The Building Society (Transfer of Business) Regulations 1998 also 
placed boards of societies under a number of more specific duties in 
regard to the conduct of the transfer of a society’s business to a 
commercial company.  In particular, the board must provide an 
objective, factual statement of the options for the future conduct of 
the society’s business, and must give reasons for any recommendation 
by the board in support of the transfer. 
 
It is arguable that the current regulatory framework of building 
society transfers gives boards of societies greater autonomy to take 
into account a wide range of interests which would be affected by a 
hostile takeover, than is the case with listed companies.  The reference 
in the 1998 Regulations to the divergent interests of borrowing and 
investing members is a recognition that building societies are in a 
distinctive position in this regard.  Likewise, the reference in the 
Guidance Note to the interests of present and future members is a 
potentially important clarification of the content of the directors’ 
fiduciary duties.  This clarification runs strongly counter to the short-
term orientation which characterises the City Code in the case of 
listed company takeovers. 
 
However, notwithstanding these provisions, the board may have only 
limited room to manoeuvre if it is faced with strong pressure from 
members for a vote on demutualisation.  Under building societies 
legislation, the number of members needed to requisition a special 
meeting under the rules of a society may not exceed 100.
12  T h e  
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and the circumstances under which a board must respond to an 
instruction from members to initiate a transfer, are not completely 
clear in the present state of the law.  It is therefore open to a potential 
bidder to encourage the members to take steps which, either in law or 
in practice, will oblige a board to put the matter of a transfer to a vote 
of the members under the procedure laid down in the 1986 Act. 
 
In short, the effect of the 1986 Act, in making demutualisation 
possible, was far reaching.   The close relationship between property 
rights, governance structures and objects which had characterised the 
traditional building society model was undermined, in favour of what 
was essentially a hybrid model.  This hybrid shared some features of 
the traditional mutual, in which the residual from the society’s 
business was effectively locked up, for transfer to future generations, 
with a commercial company model in which that residual could be 
realised for short-term gains by the present members.  In the process, 
the traditional autonomy of building society boards was called into 
question.  In particular, the possibility of a hostile takeover being 
mounted through the route of an internal ‘proxy fight’ was increased 
by legislative changes which made it easier for members to 
requisition a special meeting at which the views of the members on 
demutualisation might be sought.  It is against this background that 
the demutualisation wave of the late 1990s took place. 
 
4. Evaluating the demutualisation process 
 
We now turn to an evaluation of the demutualisation process.  We 
firstly identify the extent to which demutualisation decisions appear to 
have turned on the private incentives of managers and speculators.  
We then examine the impact of conversion on borrowers and on local 
communities served by building societies.   Finally we assess the 
efficiency case for and against the preservation of building societies, 
drawing on what is known from empirical studies of the properties of 
this type of financial mutual. 
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A senior manager of the Halifax noted some time before the 
demutualisation of this building society that ‘all arguments for 
conversion are fairly arcane as far as our members are concerned.   
The single argument that will convince them is the release-of-value 
argument.’
13  Prior to the demutualisation decisions of the large 
building societies in the mid-1990s, speculative flows of money to 
building societies had followed indications of their likely 
demutualisation, spurred by the promise of cash and/or share 
distributions (Davidmann, 1996).  Subsequently, ‘carpetbaggers’ 
opened accounts specifically to promote conversion in a particular 
society, or in a number of societies.
14   
 
As we have seen, the legislative requirements on voter turnout and 
voting support required for investors were set at higher thresholds 
than those for borrowers.  In the case of investors, turnout and support 
requirements were 50% and 75% respectively, while in the case of 
borrowers there was no turnout requirement and only support by a 
majority vote was required for a conversion resolution to pass.   
Although the high thresholds set for investor members were intended 
to provide protection for the borrowers, in practice they may also 
have made it more likely that investors would vote, so tilting the 
outcome in favour of conversion. Voting outcomes for conversion 
decisions consistently demonstrated greater support for conversion 
among investors than among borrowers.  In the case of Bradford & 
Bingley demutualisation, although overall the vote was in favour of 
conversion (62%), 60% of borrowers who took part  voted in favour 
of the society remaining mutual.  The result did not pass the statutory 
hurdle for conversion decision to go ahead; it was the board which 
took the decision to initiate conversion proceedings on the basis of the 
result.
15  This support was won on the basis of projected average 
payouts of £2,000.  The actual average payout, decided at the time of 
B&B’s floatation last December, turned out to be somewhat lower at 
250 shares per member, worth only £610 at the end of the first day's 
trading.
16 
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significant role.  Davidmann (1996) identifies the following potential 
factors: pay increases associated with executive management of 
investor-owned companies as opposed to building societies; the 
concern of senior executives and directors to maintain their position 
in the converted business; the desire for increased size and growth of 
the business over more directly member value-enhancing performance 
improvements, where pay is typically linked to deposits, turnover, and 
surplus (profit) generated; and the degree of protection from hostile 
takeovers that size offers (see also Howcroft, 1999; Barnes and Ward, 
1999).  
 
There are several instances of the conversion process itself providing 
a significant short-term source of gain for senior managers.  For 
example, at the time of the decision by Cheltenham & Goucester 
Building Society to be taken over by Lloyds, the chief executive stood 
to benefit from share options worth four times his basic salary, and he 
and his immediate family were to be granted £37,600 in cash bonuses.  
The Chairman and his immediate family stood to receive cash 
bonuses of £55,000 and eight other executives were to receive share 
options (Davidmann, 1996).   
 
The conversion process also had implications for managerial 
entrenchment.  Under the 1986 Act, conversion offered boards 
protection from hostile takeover for a period of five years from the 
date of demutualisation.   For mid-size societies such as Northern 
Rock and Alliance & Leicester in particular, conversion may have 
been seen as a means of avoiding a contested takeover (Marshall et 
al., 1997; Gilmore, 1997). 
 
The strong private incentives of managers, in some societies, and 
‘carpetbaggers’ in favour of conversion are not in doubt.  This in itself 
does not imply that conversion was inefficient.  Individual self-
interest could be the driver of a change which results in overall 
efficiency gains, as it is often claimed to be for hostile takeovers and 
other mechanisms of restructuring in the case of shareholder-owned 
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communities? 
 
4.2  Consumer welfare considerations: the effects of 
demutualisation on borrowers and communities 
 
In contrast to the immediate gains to managers and speculative 
investors, there is substantial evidence that demutualisation harms the 
interests of borrowers in all but the very short term. The windfall 
gains to building society borrowers, in common with investors, might 
enjoy as a result of demutualisation, have been calculated to fall short 
of the overall increases in the margins between interest charged on 
mortgages and interest earned on savings: ‘the typical period after 
which demutualisation would be seen to be a disadvantage was four 
years for a mortgage payer.’
 17  It is only for a ‘carpetbagger’ 
investing the minimum £100, as has been the strategy of many 
speculators to gain membership, that the gains would clearly 
outweigh the losses. 
 
Building societies are able to offer cheaper loans to borrowers 
because they enjoy an important cost efficiency in not having to 
service external capital (Brown-Hume, 1999b). Building societies are 
not expected to pay dividends to shareholders, as listed companies 
are.  In principle, this results in a lower cost of capital and therefore a 
greater surplus to be devoted to the running of the business.  This 
means that building societies can either build up reserves or sustain a 
smaller differential between the interest paid on investments and the 
interest rate charged on mortgages than a bank with similar operating 
costs.   
 
The evidence on the interest margin between savings and mortgages 
for building societies compares favourably with that for banks and 
lends support to this proposition.  The ninth edition of the annual 
KPMG survey of building societies’ financial performance, published 
in September 1999, shows that the average industry net interest 
margin for building societies was 1.55%, which was 0.5% lower than 
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margins building societies were showing reduced profits, resulting in 
a ‘modest’ reduction in the industry’s average capital strength: 
average gross capital fell from 8.4% to 8.29% (KPMG, 1999). Results 
from a study published in 1997 by SBC Warburg Dillon Reed, 
investigating the sustainability of this pricing strategy, found that four 
of the largest building societies could sustain their pricing strategy 
indefinitely, with the remainder being able to sustain their pricing 
strategies for between nine and thirty-four years.
18 
 
While not all investor-owned companies pay dividends and some 
building societies do pay profit-related bonuses to their members, in 
the case of building societies, all redistributed profits (in the form of 
higher savings and lower borrowing rates or in the form of loyalty 
incentives schemes) are returned directly to customers, as opposed to 
shareholders, who may or may not be customers.  In 1998 two 
independent surveys of the mortgage market, one by The Research 
Department and one by Moneyfacts, found that building societies 
offered the most competitive loans over both one and three years.  
Similar results were reached by both in finding that, of the 30 largest 
lenders in the UK, nine of the ten cheapest were mutual building 
societies, and nine of the ten most expensive lenders were banks.
19  
Survey results published in the March 1999 edition of What 
Mortgage? show that, of 73 lenders, the cheapest 30 over a 10 year 
period were all building societies.
20  It has also been argued that the 
converted building societies are the ones offering some of the least 
attractive rates (see Simon, 2000). 
 
More generally, there is evidence that demutualisation exacerbates the 
problem of financial exclusion which arises from financial institutions 
merging and then rationalising their branch structures, or simply 
closing down branches in less profitable communities (see Conaty and 
Mayo, 1999, and Leyshon and Thrift, 1996).  A BSA sponsored 
research project at the University of Newcastle found that societies 
that had not demutualised were opening more branches, whereas 
societies which had chosen the conversion route were closing 
  27branches.
21 Abbey National, the first of the building societies to 
convert, cut by several hundred the number of community branches 
(small sub-branches) between 1989 and 1996.  Following its takeover 
of National & Provincial Building Society in 1995, it also planned to 
close N&P’s 200 community branches (Davidmann, 1996). The 1999 
KPMG annual survey found that there was a net loss of just over 1% 
of building societies’ networks.  Since this was far below the loss of 
networks by commercial banks, and in light of the potential for 
remote distribution that electronic technologies make available, it was 
considered to be ‘a consequence of societies seeking to demonstrate 
mutuality by keeping branches open to serve local members’ (KPMG, 
1999). 
 
Since the demutualisation wave, credit unions have begun to fill the 
gap in financial services provision where building society conversions 
and the associated withdrawal of community branch structures have 
left poorer communities and socio-economic groups under-serviced.
22 
McKillop and Ferguson (1998) show that credit unions are (weakly) 
biased towards the interests of borrowers. They argue that, given the 
important role that credit unions play in extending credit to members 
of low-income communities, this bias is socially optimal, and that 
existing dividend and loan rate ceilings imposed on credit unions 
should remain in place. On this basis, credit unions would appear to 
have a comparative advantage in overcoming moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems in providing small loans to individuals 
who would otherwise not have access to credit.  However, this sector 
is still small in terms of total assets (amounting to £124 in 1998 
(Amess and Howcroft, 2001: 60)) and the demise of building societies 
will leave under-serviced many looking for stable, low interest 
mortgages.  
 
4.3  Potential efficiency gains: access to capital; diversification of 
functions and services 
 
What of the efficiency gains from conversion?   Easier access to 
capital markets was part of the justification for conversion given by 
  28the Halifax, Alliance and Leicester, Northern Rock, and Woolwich 
building societies. On this basis, building societies require access to 
capital in order to grow or in order to support existing operations in 
changed market conditions.   Conversion provides access to equity 
capital, whereas building societies’ capital sources are limited to 
retained profits and subordinated debt. 
 
This argument would have greater force if converting societies had 
weak capital bases at the time of conversion, and if they used 
conversion to build up their reserves.  The opposite seems to be the 
case.  A 1999 analysts’ report by Thompson Financial Watch noted 
that converting building societies were found to have stronger capital 
bases than non-converting societies, and found limited evidence that 
demutualised building societies were taking advantage of the access 
to capital afforded by investor-owned status.  Rather than accessing 
the capital markets, all of the demutualised societies had been aiming 
to reduce capital ratios following conversion.
23  
 
Societies seeking access to capital do, in practice, have other options 
open to them.  It is possible (and lawful) for them to leverage their 
substantial reserves to issue subordinated debt if, indeed, they require 
access to capital, and many have done so over the past few years. The 
Nationwide, currently the largest building society, is among several to 
have issued debt in the form of ‘PIBS’ (preference interest-bearing 
securities). Other options open to building societies include raising 
profitability for growth through off-balance-sheet business and 
income derived from services, which do not require additional capital; 
securitising existing assets; and diversifying through agency 
arrangements rather than through growth (Llewellyn and Holmes, 
1991). 
 
It is also possible that the flow of new equity capital to newly 
demutualised financial services firms would be limited.  Excess 
capacity in globalised banking markets, caused by a rise in the 
number of investor-owned banking institutions and competitive 
pressures from new entrants in deregulated markets, point in this 
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demutualisation of Bradford and Bingley Building Society, on 
whether a stock market flotation would deliver the returns anticipated. 
With poor institutional investor interest and shrinking market 
valuations for banks, there was speculation that the Bradford and 
Bingley would choose to convert via a trade sale instead.
24 
  
US evidence on conversions among mutual life insurers likewise 
suggests that demutualisations are  not motivated by the need to 
access capital.  Mutuals with strong reserves are more rather than less 
likely to convert, precisely because they offer better opportunities for 
wealth transfer to prospective shareholders.   In a sample of US life 
insurers it was found that the level of free cash flow was positively 
associated with the likelihood of demutualisation and that 
demutualising insurers had significantly higher ratios of surplus to 
assets than other mutuals (Carson et al., 1999). 
 
Another argument frequently put during the recent wave of 
demutualisations was that the legislation under which building 
societies operate disadvantages them relative to investor-owned banks 
by placing greater restrictions on the range of activities that they can 
undertake. As we have seen, legislation from the mid-1980s has 
gradually eased the conditions attaching to the commercial activities 
of building societies.  The range of areas into which building societies 
have diversified was discussed in the BSA’s comments on the UK 
Banking Services Review Consultation Document, published 25 
January 1999: 
 
‘A number of societies are able to offer independent financial 
advice on products regulated under the Financial Services Act 
and two societies have life insurance subsidiaries.  A number of 
societies offer money transmission accounts (although not all 
offer overdraft facilities) and credit cards, while others operate 
estate agency and stockbroking subsidiaries.  For some societies 
these activities comprise a substantial part of their business; for 
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the mainstream mortgage and savings activities.’
25 
 
It has nevertheless been suggested that ‘building society restrictions 
demonstrate a lack of competitive neutrality vis-à-vis banks and limit 
the opportunity for diversification and risk reduction, e.g. the still 
heavy reliance upon the housing market which may tend to reduce 
safety and stability’ (Jarman, 1999).   Surveys of building societies’ 
attitudes towards regulation suggest that larger building societies do 
perceive a restraint, in particular with respect to the extent to which 
they can diversify their assets (ibid.).  Whether this is an inherent 
problem is not clear. The presence of a legislative constraint is, as we 
have seen, an inherent part of the ‘mutuality contract’ with its 
attendant incentive effects. It seems that smaller societies appear to 
accept the statutory ‘straightjacket’ more readily.  It can be argued 
that the lifting of certain legislative restrictions would be preferable to 
conversion as a means of overcoming the supposed negative effects of 
the overdependence of building societies on a small range of products.   
 
4.4 Accountability, control and performance: theory and evidence 
 
At the heart of the argument for conversion is the claim that investor-
owned status provides a stricter performance focus and clearer lines 
of accountability and a more efficient solution to the problem of 
divergence of interests among classes of claimants (Hird, 1996). 
According to this point of view, demutualisation is seen to promise 
improved corporate governance via stricter stock market discipline; 
greater clarity of ownership rights; incentives for shareholder activism 
through concentrated holdings and the one share, one vote system of 
shareholder control; and potential for higher-powered managerial 
incentive structures through share and share-option grants. 
 
In principle, such a claim goes against the suggestion that a diversity 
of corporate forms, offering different solutions to the trade-off 
between internal and external governance costs identified by 
Hansmann (1996), is preferable to a one-size-fits-all approach in 
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There is, moreover, a substantial body of empirical evidence to 
support the argument that shareholder-owned companies and mutuals 
serve different purposes, take different attitudes to risk, and so offer 
alternative combinations of risk and return in such a way as to 
promote customer choice. 
 
4.4.1 Board governance 
 
One aspect of this is the internal control environment, particularly 
board monitoring and control and the use of incentives.  Mayers et al. 
(1997) examine board composition of US mutual life insurance 
companies.  They point out ways in which the inalienability of 
ownership rights of mutual policyholders places constraints on the 
‘corporate control technology’ available to them as owners and argue 
that this places greater emphasis on the use of outside board members 
in mutuals.  Their findings support this proposition.  They find that, 
for a sample of 120 mutual and 225 commercial life insurance 
companies in the US, the boards of mutuals had larger proportions of 
outside directors than the boards of commercial insurance companies.  
They also find that there was greater use of outside board members by 
mutuals which had recently converted from commercial form, than 
among similar companies in the commercial sector. In addition, 
provisions relating to outside director representation were more 
demanding for mutuals than for listed companies, reflecting a greater 
emphasis on the role of outside directors on mutuals’ boards.  There 
was evidence of increased control by outside directors on 
policyholders’ behalf, in that, where mutuals had greater outside 
director representation, there were lower costs related to managerial 
value extraction (usually reflected in measures related to salary, 
wages and rent).  However, for listed companies the number of 
outsiders has no discernible effect on the magnitude of these 
expenditures.  Therefore, where other control mechanisms are not 
available to mutuals as a result of their inherent ownership structure, 
there is evidence that available controls are leveraged to achieve a 
comparable control environment to that of listed companies.  These 
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greater use of board committees, and greater likelihood of having a 
remuneration committee (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 1996). 
 
Incentive structures for both listed company and building society 
executive management include a basic salary and benefits, as well as 
an incentive component.  The incentive component for executives of 
the Nationwide, the largest UK building society, has an annual bonus 
scheme, which is determined on the basis of performance-related 
criteria, and a medium term incentive plan, which takes a three year 
approach to the evaluation of business success.  Four performance 
measures comprise the bonus plan: member satisfaction, efficiency, 
profits sufficient to sustain capital ratios, and personal performance.
26  
The typical listed company also incentivises its management with an 
annual bonus scheme, usually paid out in cash, and a longer term 
incentive scheme based on performance over (usually) three years, 
paid out in (usually) in both cash and shares.  Option grants may be 
made as part of, or in addition to this longer-term incentive scheme. 
Rarely is any reference made in the remuneration reports of listed 
companies to non-financial performance criteria involving employee 
or customer satisfaction. 
 
Another key difference between mutual and listed company executive 
compensation is the lack of an incentive mechanism equivalent to 
stock grants or stock options (due to the absence of a market in 
tradeable ownership rights).  Managerial share ownership is seen to 
reduce agency costs by having ‘managers bear the full impact of their 
decisions on their personal wealth’,
27 thereby aligning their incentives 
more closely with the financial interests of shareholders.  The 
granting of share options has been seen to provide the opportunity to 
present management with even more highly powered incentives than 
share grants.  However, the research evidence on the link between 
director pay and company performance in public listed companies 
remains inconclusive – especially with respect to the use of share-
based compensation – and indignation at the size and growth rate of 
executive salaries persists in the press in both the UK and the US 
  33(where the use of share-based compensation is even higher).  A recent 
survey of executive remuneration showed that, the market downturn 
notwithstanding, executive pay was up 8% on last year’s figures for 
FTSE-100 companies, whereas the average employee salary only 
increased by 3 or 4%.
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What is clear is that, at an average of £600,000 per executive director 
in direct payments (payments before long-term incentive plan or stock 
option awards are calculated) (Cook and Leissle, 2000), executive 
director payments represent a not insignificant cost to public 
companies.  This is a cost that, for whatever reason, appears to have 
been contained to a greater extent in the building societies sector.   
According to Bob Goodall of Save Our Building Societies, a director 
of Bradford & Bingley saw his salary rise from £87,698 in 1999,   




4.4.2 The market for corporate control 
 
As we have seen, the ability of mutuals’ members to redeem their 
claims on demand at a price set according to a pre-specified rule, 
means that there is no secondary market for ownership claims in 
mutuals.  Therefore there is no price mechanism through which the 
present value of the ownership claim, incorporating the ‘implications 
of internal decisions for current and future net cash flows’, can be 
signalled, and there is also no medium through which ownership 
transfers can take place (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Thompson, 1997). 
 
In comparing the external disciplinary pressures on mutuals’ and 
listed companies’ top management it is important, however, to bear in 
mind that there are other external disciplinary pressures which might 
substitute for an active market for corporate control in the building 
societies sector.  One possibility is that control operates through 
external product market competition.  In this vein, Llewellyn and 
Holmes (1991 and 1997) argue that competition among financial 
services firms - which, for building societies, has increased in both 
  34key markets (retail deposits and mortgages) dramatically since the 
beginning of the 1980s - has placed considerable pressure on building 
societies to improve efficiency (see also Drake, 1995).  This pressure, 
they argue, has had a more substantial disciplining influence on 
building society management than pressures which the stock market is 
able to exert on listed companies. 
 
Inefficient managerial behaviour can cause depositors to withdraw 
their funds.  Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) argue that the absence of 
external stock market control is offset by members’ rights to 
withdraw funds from mutuals quickly and at little expense.  This 
imposes on mutuals’ management a discipline comparable to the 
market for corporate control in that ‘exit’ reduces the amount of assets 
that management control. Moreover, it may be argued that the use of 
exit provides a more powerful control over the management of 
mutuals than in the case of listed companies, in that the sale of an 
equity stake does not have the same direct effect on the amount of 
assets under management control in the case of a listed company, 
even if the share price should fall (Drake, 1997).  
 
As we have seen, the Building Societies Acts provide for the 
equivalent of mergers in the building societies sector, through a 
transfer of a society’s business to another society or to an investor-
owned company.  In addition, mergers or acquisitions have sometimes 
taken place at the encouragement of the regulator.  Where the 
viability of a building society is threatened, the regulator will be 
concerned to maintain the confidence of the public in the building 
societies sector and therefore encourage the takeover of the ailing 
building society by a viable society.  In the case of a very small ailing 
building society, relative to the acquirer, the usual requirement for 
member-consent may be waived (Ingham and Wong, 1994). 
 
These remedial interventions by the regulator may function in some 
ways as would the disciplining effects of the threat of takeover in the 
case of under-performing management in the investor-owned sector.  
Thompson (1997) notes that, despite the absence of hostile takeovers 
  35among building societies, there has nonetheless been a large amount 
of merger and acquisition activity in this sector.  For instance, 
between April 1981 and April 1993, 115 out of 200 societies 
disappeared through intra-sector mergers.  He identifies three testable 
hypotheses for explaining the observed merger activity in the building 
societies sector.  The first two, the pursuit of synergies and the 
functioning of the market for corporate control, comprise the ‘natural 
selection’ process.  The third encompasses merger and acquisition 
activity aimed at delivering size and growth, that is, fulfilling 
managerialist objectives.  Thompson found that any society posting a 
loss had a greatly increased probability of being acquired and 
societies with reserves above the minimum level had a reduced 
probability of being acquired.  This activity appeared to have been 
prompted by the regulator and partially substituted for a stock market-
driven market for corporate control. 
 
4.4.3 ‘Common bond’ and governance 
 
Amess and Howcroft (2001) argue that the higher level of trust and 
co-operation that prevails in mutuals, particularly small mutuals like 
credit unions, as opposed to shareholder-owned financial institutions, 
facilitates implicit contracting.  This gives them a comparative 
advantage in economizing on transaction costs of governance and 
more efficiently solving problems associated with adverse selection 
and moral hazard. The Credit Union Act 1979 imposes a ‘common 
bond’ requirement to the effect that membership be based on 
occupation, residential or employment locality, employer, club or 
other organisational membership.  Beyond its legal form, the 
‘common bond’ can be thought of as a social psychological construct.  
The threat to the continued role of mutuality in the British economy 
and in British society has given impetus to a resurgence in the support 
for mutuality, with the emergence of pro-mutual groups such as Save 
Our Building Societies and Mutuo.
30  This commitment to mutuality 
is itself a form of ‘common bond’, which surviving building society 
members, especially members of regional building societies, may 
experience.  The requirement of some building societies that new 
  36members sign away benefits from conversion to charities, which is 
seen to screen out carpetbaggers from those genuinely interested in 
building society membership, can likewise be seen as restoring the 
‘common bond’ between new and incumbent members.
31    
 
4.4.4  Direct performance comparisons of mutuals and investor-
owned banks 
 
Further evidence is available from studies examining the efficiency 
and profitability of mutuals relative to listed companies providing 
similar services, such as mortgage finance and personal savings 
services.  Efficiency and profitability measures are often used as 
proxy measures for managerial performance, or as indicators of the 
relative size of underlying agency problems.  Drake (1997) charts cost 
to income and return on capital ratios for UK building societies and 
commercial banks.  These show that building societies have tended to 
operate with greater efficiency, showing much lower cost to income 
ratios over the period 1970-1994, and with higher and less volatile 
profitability.  These efficiencies may be used to bolster building 
society reserves or can be redistributed to members via improved 
rates.  Valnek (1999) derives empirical evidence for the period 1983 
to 1993 showing that UK building societies had significantly higher 
returns on assets, whether or not measures were risk-adjusted, as well 
as higher net income than investor-owned banks.  Since the mid-
1990s these performance advantages appear to have been translated 
into superior savings and borrowing rates offered by building 
societies to their members.  
 
The economic literature also supports the suggestion that financial 
mutuals gain competitive advantage from being better able to address 
agency or governance problems arising from heterogeneity of 
interests than is the case with investor-owned companies. Mayers and 
Smith (1988) argue that the longer the term of the contractual 
relationship between the mutual and its members (they focus on 
insurance mutuals), the larger the incentives would be for external 
shareholders to expropriate rents from depositors /mortgage 
  37holders/policy holders.  Therefore, combining the ownership and 
debtholding functions removes costly conflicts of interest between 
policyholders and owners in the case of mutual insurance companies.  
Hart and Moore (1998) also develop a case for arguing that mutuals’ 
efficiency advantage is contingent on them having a more 
homogeneous clientele than investor-owned banks (based on 
efficiency analyses of stock exchange movements).  From this Valnek 
(1999: 929) extrapolates that ‘as small retail and large corporate 
customers most probably have different preferences, [mutuals] avoid 
costs related to conflicts between different groups of a heterogeneous 
clientele.’ 
 
As we have seen, in mutual building societies, as opposed to investor-
owned retail banks, the functions of owner (shareholder) and 
customer (depositors and borrowers) are combined.  In addition, the 
clientele is comparatively homogeneous, in that building societies are 
restricted to some extent to the activities of accepting retail deposits 
and engaging in home mortgage lending, whereas banks’ customers 
consist of individuals as well as corporate customers.  In the case of 
commercial retail banks, shareholders’ interests diverge from those of 
policyholders, mortgage holders or depositors.  Hence Drake (1997:7) 
notes that: 
 
‘equity shareholders may prefer a higher risk profile for the 
institution than would depositors due to the former’s limited 
liability.  This implies that shareholders can benefit from 
potentially significant “upside gains” while being exposed to only 
limited downside potential.  In contrast, depositors do not share 
this upside potential and would implicitly be subject to greater 
risk given the limited scope of deposit insurance.  Clearly, in 
financial mutuals this particular aspect of the agency problem is 
absent as owners and customers are one and the same.’ 
 
Life insurance and mortgage provision also involve long-term 
contracting with members, in contrast to equity investments which 
typically involve short-term ‘spot’ transactions.  Those with longer-
  38term contracts are more vulnerable to exploitation by those with 
shorter-term interests in the organisation: 
 
‘The owner-policyholder conflict is likely to be relatively high in 
the stock ownership form because stockholders have an incentive 
to expropriate value from policyholders [or mortgage holders] by 
taking actions such as changing the risk-characteristics of the 
firm after policies have been issued.’ (Cummins, Weiss and Zi, 
1999: 1255) 
 
While financial mutuals may avoid some of these costs, it could be 
suggested that the absence of a clear shareholder value norm insulates 
building society managers from pressures to limit ‘expense-preference 
behaviour’.  This refers to the extent to which managers spend 
unnecessarily on things that they prefer, but which are not necessarily 
value-enhancing, such as excessive salaries, additional staff, and other 
perks (Drake, 1995).  The evidence here is equivocal.  Cummins, 
Weiss and Zi (1999) find evidence from the US property liability 
insurance industry, derived from the period 1980-1991, indicating that 
mutuals and investor-owned companies operate on different 
production and cost frontiers.  This means that each employs a 
different technology (broadly defined as encompassing both the 
contractual arrangements and the physical technologies).  They found 
that investor-owned companies were better than mutuals at producing 
the outputs that investor-owned companies would normally produce 
(that is, operating in more complex and heterogenous lines of 
business) and that mutuals were more efficient at producing outputs 
typical of mutuals.  However, within their respective areas of 
operation, investor-owned companies appeared to have a comparative 
advantage over mutuals at controlling costs, which the researchers 
take as indicating a greater potential for expense-preference behaviour 
among mutuals’ management than among investor-owned companies, 
and, therefore, higher costs associated with managerial opportunism.  
 
Valnek (1999) finds that, where mutuals and commercial retail banks 
engage in activities of similar riskiness (indicated by identical 
  39standard deviations on their returns on assets), banks appear to suffer 
higher costs from the downside outcomes of risk and make higher 
loan loss reserve provisions, which reflect a greater propensity for 
risk-taking among managers of banks, and the consequent riskier 
nature of undertakings by banks, as compared to mutuals.  One 
possible explanation is that managers of banks probably hold shares 
in their firms and therefore stand to gain from risky decisions.   
Managers of mutuals, on the other hand, can only lose their perks by 
taking risky decisions which might bankrupt the organisation.  Risk-
averse depositors will realise this and choose to bank with mutuals 
over commercial banks.  Thus self-selection of clientele takes place.  
 
4.5 Preserving a plurality of forms in financial services provision 
 
Attempts to understand the coexistence of mutuals and investor-
owned companies in particular sectors of the financial services 
industry (most focus on the US life and property insurance industry, 
although findings are considered to be generalisable) address agency-
theory propositions regarding owner-manager incentive conflicts and 
owner-policyholder/mortgage holder conflicts of interest.  These 
hypotheses predict that listed companies are best suited to solving the 
former but that the mutual form solves the latter.  From these 
propositions have been derived various hypotheses regarding the 
market areas and types of business operations that each is best suited 
to.  In general terms, it is suggested that listed companies will be most 
prevalent in activities that involve significant managerial discretion, 
and that mutuals will be most prevalent in lines of business requiring 
long-term contracting (see Pottier and Summer, 1997). 
 
A number of studies have found that, where listed companies and 
mutuals are represented in the same sectors, listed companies are 
generally associated with riskier activities, spread over greater 
geographic areas.  Mutuals tend to be more prevalent in activities 
involving longer-term contracting and showing lower risk.   
Managerial incentives and self-selection of clientele may constitute 
part of the explanation, in line with Rasmusen (1988).   
  40A number of arguments, based on propositions derived from inherent 
differences between mutuals and listed companies, have been put 
forward to explain why mutuals can be expected to be involved in less 
risky activities (see, for instance, Fama and Jensen, 1983b, and Smith 
and Stutzer, 1995).  Smith and Stutzer (1995) develop a model which 
explains the coexistence of mutuals and investor-owned companies in 
the insurance industry by arguing that mutuals are better suited to 
addressing problems of moral hazard arising out of information 
asymmetries.  In the case of participating insurance contracts (sold 
mainly by mutuals), the insured shares in the overall operating risk of 
the insurance company, whereas in the case of non-participating 
insurance contracts, the price of insurance is set beforehand.  This will 
lead to an outcome where high-risk insurance consumers will 
purchase non-participating policies (sold mainly by investor-owned 
insurance providers) and low-risk consumers will purchase 
participating policies (Smith and Stutzer, 1990). 
 
Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship between organisational form and the risk of activities 
undertaken.  They confirm that, overall, investor-owned companies 
have higher total risk than mutuals.  In particular, they find that 
activities in more riskier lines of business are most likely to be offered 
by investor-owned companies, investor-owned companies are more 
likely to be prevalent in geographic areas with higher risk, and 
investor-owned companies sell policies in more lines of business.  
 
Born et al. (1995) focus on companies in the US property-casualty 
industry to investigate the extent to which their prevalence in various 
lines is related to their particular approach to agency problems.  They 
found that investor-owned companies generally serve broader 
geographical areas and write more lines of insurance than mutuals.  
This observation is consistent with arguments that mutuals are better 
suited to operating in only a narrow range of operations and over a 
limited geographic area.  Secondly, investor-owned companies 
appeared to respond to reduced profitability in particular markets by 
cutting back business operations more rapidly than mutuals and 
  41expanding operations in profitable areas more rapidly.  This might 
reflect the potential for opportunism where the interests of 
shareholders and policyholders may differ.  Thirdly, they found that, 
for a given amount of premiums, investor-owned companies have 
higher losses than mutuals.  This is taken to indicate that mutuals are 
better at screening or at attracting less risky business than investor-
owned companies. 
 
Similarly, Cummins, Weiss and Zi (1999) present empirical evidence 
showing that mutuals are best suited to lines of business involving 
less managerial discretion but longer contractual time horizons, 
whereas investor-owned companies are best suited to lines where 
managers are required to exercise a relatively greater amount of 
discretion in business decisions and in operating over larger 
geographical areas.  The former’s technical advantage is considered to 
lie in its ability to deal effectively with the owner-policyholder 
conflict, whereas the latter is considered to have an advantage in 





This paper has reviewed the substantial empirical evidence relating to 
the comparative properties, in terms of corporate governance, of 
mutuals and investor-owned companies. The evidence supports the 
suggestion that mutuals and investor-owned companies provide 
distinct solutions to the problems which are inherent in corporate 
governance.  The extent to which costs associated with one type of 
governance arrangement outweigh those associated with the other 
type will therefore determine which form is most prevalent in 
particular types of commercial activities. Empirical evidence suggests 
that, as theory implies, investor-owned companies make higher 
returns for investors and undertake riskier business ventures than 
mutuals do.  Conversely, the mutual form is more appropriate, in 
principle, for dealing with long-term, incomplete contracts of the kind 
required by personal borrowers seeking a low-risk loan for the 
  42purposes of house purchase and savers seeking a low-risk form of 
saving.   
 
There is therefore empirical support for the claim that the legal and 
institutional framework should encourage the preservation of diversity 
within the financial sector as a whole.  Inefficiencies would result, 
from a governance perspective, should financial mutuals begin to 
disappear as a result of conversion to investor-owned status.  Such a 
move is not easily reversed. The Ecology Building Society is the only 
building society to have been created in recent years.  It was set up in 
1981 and is dedicated to building projects which follow ecological 
principles.  Llewellyn and Holmes (1991:321) argue ‘there is virtually 
no possibility of [listed companies] converting to mutual status and 
few new mutuals are being formed.  It is difficult to reverse 
demutualisation.’  Leadbeater and Christie (1999:59) likewise note 
that ‘[r]egulatory requirements designed to ensure lenders have a 
healthy balance sheet make it virtually impossible to create a new 
building society from scratch.’  Once the accumulated surplus from 
generations of organisation is dissipated, it cannot be quickly restored. 
 
How, then, is it possible that the building society sector should have 
shrunk as it has in the wake of the deregulatory changes made by the 
1986 Act?  The answer lies in a close analysis of this variant of the 
mutual form as it developed during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.  The ‘permanent’ building society form was a highly 
successful institutional innovation which married the needs of 
homebuyers for low-cost loans with those of investors in search of a 
low-risk form of saving.  The inherent divergencies of interests 
between investors and borrowers was solved by severely restricting 
the property rights of both groups, to the extent that their claim to be 
the residual owners of the income stream generated by the 
organisation was highly attenuated, at best.  
 
The gradual mutation of the original customer-owned form (the 
terminating society) into a type of non-profit enterprise within which 
managers acted as fiduciaries for successive generations of borrowers 
  43(the permanent form) created problems of its own. In the 1950s, 
building societies grew rapidly in a period when they were protected 
against effective competition both from the commercial retail banks 
and from each other; again, in the early 1990s, societies accumulated 
large reserves which attracted the interest of speculative investors.   
Meanwhile, active member participation in the affairs of societies 




Against this background, the introduction of competition in the retail 
banking and mortgage market at the same time as changes to 
corporate governance made conversion possible acted as a major 
external shock.  By facilitating conversion  without putting effective 
safeguards in place against opportunistic entry by investors intent 
only on netting a windfall gain, the 1986 Act altered the environment 
in such a way as to make it likely that building societies would come 
under considerable pressure for demutualisation.  The hybrid form 
which emerged after the Abbey National judgment in 1989 was 
inherently unstable, and its unravelling was inevitable.  But it is 
possible that no safeguards could have been effective once the 
possibility of realising the surplus via conversion was in place. 
 
The institutional guarantor of the mutuality contract was the much 
(and unfairly) maligned ‘legislative straightjacket’.  Without this in 
place, the task of maintaining a coalition to defend mutual status was 
inherently problematic.  The use of charitable assignments and other 
devices to fend off ‘carpetbaggers’ was an evolutionary response from 
the supporters of mutuality within building societies which may, to 
some extent, have succeeded.  However, without some attempt to 
arrive at a new legislative solution to protect mutual status from 
predation of this sort, it cannot be said that the future of the remaining 
building societies is ensured.  Regulatory intervention will be required 
to for these societies to be able to credibly commit to the principles of 
mutuality in the long term, protecting the confidence and trust of 
existing and potential members. 
  44The recent history of the British building society sector therefore 
demonstrates the dangers of assuming that the evolution of 
organisations reflects a process of convergence on efficient forms.   
The path of change is shaped by contingent events and by shifts in the 
institutional environment which are sparked of by the legislative 
process (Roe, 1994).  Deregulation which brings about changes in 
property rights can have unanticipated, destabilising effects on 
corporate governance.  Supporters of the Building Societies Act 1986 
apparently did not anticipate that it would lead to a shrinking of the 
mutual sector.  The Act put in place statutory protections to guard 
against the very divergencies of interest between managers and 
investors, on the one hand, and borrowers, on the other, which later 
proved to be the catalyst for demutualisation.  To understand better 
the processes involved, a focus on the role of collective actors in 
pushing for legislative and judicial rearrangements of property rights 
is called for.   
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1    Hansmann (1996: 12) uses the term ‘patrons’ to refer to ‘all 
persons who transact with a firm either as purchasers of the 
firm’s products or as seller to the firm of supplies, labour or 
other factors of production; here we adopt the more generally 
used term ‘stakeholder’ to refer to those who transact regularly 
with the firm in such a way as to give rise to issue of relation-
specific investment and contractual incompleteness (see 
Zingales, 1998). 
 
2   Current Legal Statutes note to the Building Societies Act 1986, 
at p. 15. 
 




4    Building Societies Act 1997, s. 1(3), amending Building 
Societies Act 1986, s. 5(5). 
 
5    Building Societies Act 1997, s. 1(1), amending Building 
Societies Act 1986, s. 5(1). 
 
6   BSA, 2000 - website; Leadbeater and Christie (1999); Marshall 
et al. (1997). 
 
7    By 1999 there were 68 building societies accounting for 18% of 
the stock of UK personal savings, 25% of the stock of UK 
residential mortgage loans to individuals (down from 80% in 
1994), and a 40% share of new net lending over the period 1997 
up to March 1999.   The sector was still important in terms of 
size - by the end of 1997 these building societies accounted for 
2.8 million borrowers and 19 million investors; and employed 
37,309 people.  See Leadbetter and Christie, 1997; Treasury 
Select Committee - Ninth Treasury Report (1999). 
 
  46 
8     Current Law Statutes annotation, at p. 203. 
 
9   Abbey National Building Society v. Building Societies 
Commission, 9 January 1989.  The judgment is not reported in 
the law reports, but is reproduced in the Annual Report of the 
Building Societies Commission for 1988-89, at pp. 53- 59. 
 
10     Current Law Statute annotation, at p. 196. 
  
11     Para. 2. 
 
12    Building Societies Act 1997, s. 25, inserting new para. 20A in 
Building Societies Act 1986, Sched. 2. 
 
13    Mike Blackburn, quoted in Clarke (1998:100). 
 
14    See, for example, Brown-Humes (1999d); Brown-Humes 
(1999b) and Calder (2000). 
 
15   See B.S. News, May (1999), 
http://www.bsa.org.uk/BSNews/bsnMay99.html. 
 
16   “Carpetbagger launches latest campaign”, Guardian, March 17 
2001. 
 
17    Treasury Select Committee - Ninth Report (1999). 
 
18    Overviewed in the BSA response to UK Banking Services 
Review consultation paper (1999) at:  
http://www.bankreview.org.uk/responses.html. 
 
19   BSA response to Banking Services Review consultation paper 
(1999). 
 
20   ‘Mutual Loathing’, Sunday Telegraph, 23 January (2000). 
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21    Treasury Select Committee - Ninth Treasury Report (1999). 
 
22   By 1998 the number of credit unions in the UK had grown to 
624 (Amess and Howcroft, 2001:60).  
 
23   Thompson Financial Bank Watch (1999), in ‘The Future of UK 
Building Societies’; summary of results in BSNews, May 
(1999), http://www.bsa.org.uk/BSNews/bsnMay99.html. 
 
24    Reuters News Service (2000), ‘B&B may opt for trade sale 
instead of IPO - paper’, Reuters Press Digests, 12 March. 
 
25   BSA response to Banking Services Review consultation paper 
(1999). 
 




27   Valnek (1999), referring to the argument first made by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). 
 
28   Brewis, J. ‘Salaries of top FTSE executives continue to rise’, 
eFinancial News, 8 May 2001 
 
29   Harvey, A. ‘Pro-mutual group on the warpath’, The Scotsman, 
17 April 2001. 
 
30    See: Harvey, A. “Pro-mutual group on the warpath”, The 
Scotsman, 17 April, 2001; and Guthrie, J. “New breed of fans 
found in football and the utilities”, Financial Times, 4 May 
2001. 
 
31   Since November 1997, the Nationwide Society has required new 
members to agree to assign any windfall to charity but has 
nevertheless attracted more than 2m new customers over the 
  48 
period. (Jenkins, P. ‘Nationwide rejects vote on conversion 
building society decision angers carpetbaggers’, Financial 
Times, Apr 21, 2001.) 
 
32   This is in contrast to patterns of active participation which, in 
varying degrees, characterise continental European forms of 
mutuality: see Cook, Deakin and Hughes, 2001: ch. 6. 
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